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Fashionable Genetic
Explanations in th,e
Courtroolll: Litigating
Personal Injuries Based
on Genetic Risk
Jennifer Wriggins

ABSTRACT
New developments in molecular genetics hold much promise for society. Gene
therapy research is underway with the aim of helping to fight, and perhaps
even eliminate some diseases. DNA data can be used as evidence to help free
innocent people and put guilty ones in jail. Agrieultural biotechnology can
make crops and pesticides more productive. And 'cloning may offer exciting
potential. There is little doubt that further· developments in the areas of
genetics and biotechnology will change our lives in unanticipated ways.
I
Despite the potential benefits to society, there exist valid and serious
I concerns about the potential for misuse of genetic informat'ion. This article
I addresses new attempts to use genetic information· in personal injury litiga
tion and the unique ethical, legal, and social issues raised by the "genetic
I defense."
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GENETICS-PROMISE
IAND PROBLEMS
I

I
I
I

Accusations of insurance discrimination associated with genetic screen
ing, and of privacy infringement

connected with DNA data ·banks, are
on the Hse. 1 Objection to the' patent
ing of living organisms is becoming a
major policy and trade issue. 2 Many
professionals and consumers are
troubled by the idea of cloning.

I
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Genetic explanations for human
behavior are becoming increasingly
fashionable. Scientific "discoveries"
often are hyped by the media. For
example, The New York Times (NYT)

''Genetic explanations for human
behavior are becoming increasingly
fashionable. Scientific 'discoveries,
often are hyped by the media.''
put on page one a story of the dis
covery· of a 'thrill-seeking gene' 3
which was said to be found in people
who sought novelty and thrills;
when the finding was refuted a few
months later, the story was on page
22. 4 What remlllus in many people's
minds from media at:counts is' the
idea that people who seek novelty
and thrills are genetically "pro
gra:mnled" to so. The NYT has·also
published a.story-in which Sldentists
claim that happiness is largely ge
netic~ly determined, although it is
acknowledged that the genes for
happiness have not been found. 5
The idea that human' charac
teristics, specifically behavioral
traits, are passed down through the
generations has a racist legacy that
shadows discussions about genet
ics. 6 Hitler took the idea to its ex
treme. Early IQ researchers in t!he
United States (US) promoted theo
ries and "scientific facts" about race
and genetic ·inhetitance that today
almost everyone would characterize
as prejudiced against nonwhites.
In this delicate nature :versus nur
ture debate, mahy scientists and so
cial analysts acknowledge that
humans can not be explained simply
by genes. Rather, a complex rela
tionship, not yet fully understood,
between genes and environment, ac
counts for human characteristics.
This complex relationship may
never be fully understood. However,
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theories about genetic determinism
are on the rise and remain extremely
popular.
.Some current ideas and manifes
tations ofgenetics pose a challenge,
if not a threat, to basic notions of
privacy, individuality, autonomy
and free will. For example, consider
the following' question: if every
thing I am and do is caused by my
genetic makeup, what individual re
sponsibility do I have for my ac
tions? In the narrower context of the
personal injury lawsuit, a defendant
might argue that it has no legal
responsibility for the dangerous
product it sold because the harm to
people was caused by people's own
genetic makeup, not by the danger
ous product.

THE "GENETIC DEFENSE"
In personal injury litigation, peo
ple often claim to have suffered in
juries which are not always
apparent, and do not always have a
clear cause. For example, a driver
might claim a broken arm from a car
accident caused by another driver's
negligence. The defense lawyer, rep
resenting the allegedly negligent
driver, would investigate the nature
of the injury, the accuracy of the
claim, whether the injury was a re
sult of the accident, and the cause of
the accident. The defense lawyer
would examine medical records, and
would interview the plaintiff under
oath. Although medical records are
highly confidential, a P,erson bring
ing a personal irtjury lawsuit implic
itly consents to having such records
disclosed. Before the 1930's, in fed
eral court, a personal injury plaintiff
would produce all evidence of her
irtjury, and a defendant had no right
to have a plaintiff examined by a
doctor of her own choosing. In the
1930s, a legal reform was intro
duced in federal court, which al
lowed the defendant to hire a doctor
to examine the injured person.

It has been known for decades that ,
ingesting lead paint can cause cog
nitive problems and low IQ in "Chil
dren. For this reason, lead paint has
been banned for residential use since
the 1970s. A landlord who rents a
property containing lead paint to a
family with children is considered I'
negligent. In a number of states, ·j
landlords are strictly liable for harm •
suffered by children residing in ~
buildings containing lead paint. The
typical lead paint case involves a \'
CASE STUD'{: DES
child who lives in a low-rent apart- '
ment containing lead paint, whose
Today, car accident cases like the
medical records show that he has
above example still arise, but differ
ingested lead, and who has cognitive
ent types of injury claims are now
problems and/or a low IQ. While
also brought, spurred on by techno
there are many causes of cognitive
logical developments and scientific
disorders and causes of low IQ, and
discoveries. The example of DES
there are no known genes for intel
(diethylstilbestrol) is instructive.
ligence, 11 landlords have argued
DES was a drug prescribed to preg
that they should be allowed to see
nant women for morning sickness.
the educational and medical records,
Children of women who took DES
not just of the injured child, but of
were found to have increased inci
the child's siblings, parents, half
dence of reproductive problems as
siblings, and even grandparents. 12 'j
adults. 8 A class of female children of
Lawyers representing landlords 1
DES mothers sued the manufactur
ers of the drug. In the early 1990s, , have also requested that IQ and Z'
in a little-noted development in the -other cognitive tests be performed
on the mother and siblings of the·
DES cases, the DES manufacturers
child, even if these individuals do not,
attempted to obtain the medical re
want these tests. This argument is
cords of the mothers of the DES
based on the theory that IQ and >
plaintiffs, claiming that such re
learning disabilities are genetically
cords were necessary to determine
and/or environmentally deter
whether the plaintiffs' injuries were
mined.13
caused by genetic abnormalities or
Courts in Massachusetts, Penn- '
hy DES. 9 The plaintiffs objected to
sylvania, Louisiana, Minnesota,
this tactic, claiming that since the
Maryland, New York, and Washing- •
mothers were not parties to the law
ton D.C. have faced these issues in I
suit and had not consented to the
recent years' and have reached dif- (
public disclosure of their medical re
ferent outcomes. 14 It is disturbing to ;
cords, the manufacturers were not
note that in the few cast;s w!J.ere a '
entitled tq the records. The court
non-party parent has been ordered ,
ultimately agreed with.this position
to have an IQ test, that parent has ,
and denied the drug manufacturers
been a black woman. There could-be ·
access to the mothers' medical re
several reasons for this, such as the
cords.10
facts that a higher proportion of :
black children suffer lead poisoning
CASE STUDY: LEAD PAINT
than white children, and most lead
poisoning
claims seem to be brought
In recent years, another example
on
behalf
of black children. How- i
of the "genetic defense" has arisen.

While controversial at first, this
practice is now .widely accepted. 7
Underlying this scheme was the
basic idea, central to our culture,
that each individual is distinct. Until
recently, no one would have thought
to examine the medical records of
the plaintiff's mother, .for example,
to see determine whether the plain
tifff may have inherited a genetic
propensity to bone fracture.
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ever, given the racist legacy ofIQtest-..
ing and of genetic research in general
'
it is a noteworthy phenomenon.

~~·STUDY:

ENVJRONMENTAL
INJURY
In another kind of case, a plaintiff
may claim that her illness is the
result of a genetic abnormality
caused by ~xp_osure to environ
mental chemiq1ls.'The plaintiff may
lYant to obtain, the medica,l records
or geneti~ information of neighbors
to show that the neighbors had the
same genetic aberration. In this way
the plaintiff hopes to prove that the
genetic problem is caused by an en
vironmental exposure. Without the
genetic information of other people
in the same. geographic area, the
plaintiff may be unable to prove the
emr,ironm~ntal link to his injury.
The neighbors, however, may be re
luctant to release their medical re
cords or subject themselves to
genetic tests.

LEGAL INTERESTS AT
STAKE IN THE GENETIC
DEFENSE
'The above examples of DES, lead,
and environmental claims, are the
tip of a developing litigation iceberg.
They illustrate competing legal in
terests and ethical conflicts which
are new to the American legal sys
teµi. There is pressure on the legal
community to develop a systematic
approach for resolving such con
flicts. At the same time there is an
interest in the legal community in
developing a valid method for using
genetic information in personal in
jury litigation.
One legal interest, which perme
ates these cases, is the privacy inter
est of the individuals about whom
medical or other information is
sought. Such individuals may in-
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elude the"parties to the case, and/or
individuals not named in the case. As
the above examples illustrate, liti
gants may want to obtain records
and/or tests of family members or
neighbors who are not even parties
to the suit. Individual~ who are not
parties to the litigation have' not
claimed any injury'and Have not put
their condition at issue. They may
want to have nothing to do with the
litigation. American adults consider
the decision of whether. or not to
seek medical services a basic free
dom, as long as one's condition is
not endangering others. Compelling
someone who is not a party to a
lawsuit, to have an IQ test or psy
chological examination against her
will, goes against the grain. Most
Americans also·take for granted the
right to keep .private ohe's medical
and academic -records. 15 Few of us
would voluntarily disclose such
documents, particularly if our inter
ests would not be served by doing so.
A competing interest is that of
litigators and dedsion-makers who
need access to accurate information
to develop and decide cases. A defen
dant should have access-to informa
tion that exonerates him from
liability. Decision-makers need ac
cess to information that is relevant
to a case even if the information is
considered private. If in fact genetic
heritage determines human charac
teristics, the parties and the judge
should have access to all conceivably
relevant information. Further, it is
inefficient for companies to pay for
damages that they did not, cause.
An additional interest is that of
the legal system, and of society as a
whole, in.resolving legal disputes. In
contrast to scientific research, which
is continually evolving, legal evi
dence must be developed and used
within a narrow timeframe. The ju
dicial system works by disposing of
cases, each based on a finite body of
evidence. Legal adjudication often
has an ad hoc quality that scientists

may find unsatisfactory. To quote
Justice Blackmun, "law...must re
solve disputes finally and quickly ...
[T]he Rules of Evidence [are] de
signed nqt for the exhaustive search
for cosmic understanding but for
the partio01arized resolution of legal
disputes." 16
Another difference between scien
tific and legal inquiry is the different
"burden.of proof" 1"equired by law
versus sc\ence. In civil cases such as
personal injury claims, the plaintiff
must show that the injuries 'more
likely than not' were .caused 'in sig
nificant part' by the defendant's ac
tions. Scientific proof is far more•
rigorous.

SCIENCE AND THE
LAW: llJ!:CONCILING
DIVERGBNTINTERESTS
l

Can we reconcile thes~ lnterests?
How? Where does .p'ur .l~}'V stap.d
now? Currently, iJ?.i;liyiquals who
a;.e.parties to pers.onal inju,ry litiga
tion must,procfuce n;iedical records
and ofte:q. must ~ubmit to medical
tests, by a do'cfor h'.ired by opposing
counsel. At P.rfserit, there is no legal
justification for coqrts .to force peo
ple to undergo nierucal examina
tions or tests or proql,lce medical
records when they are not parties to
litigation. 17 Given that our legal sys
tem is built on the principle that
individuals are autonomous, and
have the capacity to make decisions
for themselves, we are repelled' by
the notion that anyone could force
us to submit to physical examina
tion or to release our medical re
cords. Implicit in a decision to
litigate a dispute is the decision to
forgo certain privileges of privacy
and autonomy. Individuals who are
not parties to a lawsuit have not
made such a sacrifice. Current law
reflects the distinction be"tween par
ties and non-parties in allowing ex
amination of parties in some
circumstances while not allowing
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examinationi of non-parties. 18 The
few judges that have ordered such
examinations exceed the scope of
their authority. Medical records of
non-parties aFe privileged and
should not be released.
Some might advocate that these
rules be broadened so that non-par
ties can be required to release personal
records and undergo medical and ge
netic testing. They might reason that
litigants should have the opportunity
to employ the new scientific tools for
explaining behavior. For several criti
cal reasons, I believe that lawmakers
should be very cautious before broad
ening the rules in that way.
First, there is a danger that once we
breach the boundary of the individ
ual, there will be no other logical
boundary. Litigants Will seek to ex
amine records of individuals far re
moved from the circumstances at
issue. Some will argue that numerous
and distant relatives should be subject
to medical examinations. Others may
seek DNA information of dead people.
Potential plaintiffs may enlist distant
neighbors in environmental claims.
These practices challenge basic princi
ples of ethics, drive up the cost of
litigation, and may traumatize the
affected individuals.
Second, numerous questions exist
regarding the accuracy of many ge

netic tests. A New York court re
cently reversed a trial court's order
which had allowed an IQ test of a
mother, saying "since so many vari
ables are involved, the test result will
raise more questions than it will an
swer and hardly aid in the resolution
of the question of causality." 19
Questionable evidence does not serve
the interest of justice. Indeed, ques
tionable evidence may undermine
that interest if it reflects and rein
forces racial stereotypes, as may be
the case in the lead cases.
The third reason for lawmakers
to be cautious about broadening evi
dentiary rules pertaining to medical
evidence, is the paramount right to
privacy of individuals. Defining pri
vacy is notoriously difficult. Accord
ing to Professor Charles Fried
privacy is defined as "control we
have over information about our
selves.1120 Requiring individuals to
produce personal medical or educa
tional information in lawsuits, in
which they have no personal stake,
is to usurp such control and ignores
the right to privacy. Some individu
als may learn medical or psycho
logical
information
about
themselves, which they had not
wanted to know. The disclosure of
certain medical information has the
further risk of jeopardizing insur
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